This paper studies the relationship between USO and environmental concern in the postal sector. We concentrate on the obligation to deliver mail on a D+1 basis. We examine how the USO should be designed to properly account for the environmental cost in a variety of situations ranging from a first-best setting to a (Ramsey-type) second-best world with differentiated or uniform prices. We show that, it may be desirable to scale down the D+1 obligation and to restrict it to specific geographic areas. We also study how postal products should be priced to account for their environmental impact.
Introduction
The regulatory debate in the postal sector has for two decades concentrated on the liberalization process. While in the EU member states full liberalization is imminent, the debate about the desirability and viability of competition which appeared to be fading out for a while has more recently been revived because of the decreasing trend in the demand for postal products. While the crisis no doubt had a depressing effect on demand, there is also the more fundamental development that the sector faces an increasing degree of competition from electronic substitutes. This issue has received a lot of attention in the recent literature on the postal sector. However, another major trend is likely to have a significant effect on the future of the postal sector and has hitherto largely been ignored by the literature: the increasing importance of environmental considerations and policy. The postal sector affects the environment through at least two channels: the consumption of paper, on the one hand, and  2 emissions due to transportation and buildings' energy consumption, on the other hand.
In addition, environmental issues will also have a substantial impact on regulatory policies, in particular Universal Service Obligations (USO). Indeed, postal operators could reduce their emissions by transforming and modernizing their process like for instance the use of electric vehicles or the thermal insulation of facilities. But, regulatory policies may also be adapted to take into account environmental considerations (constraints on daily letter box collection and mail delivery amongst others).
In this paper, we study the impact of environmental considerations on USO. The costs and benefits of USOs have been extensively studied over the last decade. 1 It is by now well known that USO has social benefits but implies costs at various levels: private costs for the operator and efficiency costs for customers. An optimally designed USO ought to strike a balance between benefits and costs. The point we make is that environmental considerations add yet another dimension to this trade-off.
In a companion paper (Boldron et al., 2011) we provide a detailed overview of the available data that can be used to measure the environmental impact of postal activity. We show that in the case of La Poste, the two main sources of emissions are the facilities and the transport. However, facilities are responsible for less than 20% of total emissions, so that focusing on the reduction of transportation emissions may be seen as a relevant first step. This is the approach we adopt in this paper.
As far as the USO is concerned, the transportation process is mainly affected by the requirement of a national D+1 service. Because of the French geography it is necessary to resort to air transport to provide such a service. And air transportation represents 15% of the total transportation costs. Furthermore, the national  + 1 service also increases (private and social) costs associated with other means of transportation. For instance, it often implies that trucks are not fully loaded; this is costly and this increases the carbon footprint of a D+1 letter. 2 To illustrate this argument in the simplest possible way, we concentrate on a specific aspect, namely the speed of processing and delivery. USO often requires that (domestic first-class) mail be processed on a D+1 basis, irrespective of the distance between sender and addressee (and typically at a uniform rate). Now, transportation costs incurred to ensure next day delivery, both the private ones borne by the operator and the external costs associated with emissions tend to increase quite significantly with distance. For instance, with the D+1 constraint, long distance mail may have to be carried by plane, while more environmentally friendly means of transportation could be used for less urgent mail. We show that, when environmental considerations are ignored, regulators may impose a larger than otherwise optimal USO. We also study how the USO should be designed to properly account for the environmental cost in a variety of situations ranging from a first-best world to a (Ramseytype) second-best world with uniform prices.
Model
Consider a representative sender who sends mail to addressees located at a distance  ∈ [0 1]. The variable  is uniformly distributed and there is a total mass one of addressees. There are two mail products:  1 which is processed and delivered at +1 in area  1 ⊂ [0 1] and  2 which is delivered at +2 in area  2 ⊂ [0 1]. Areas  1 and  2 form a partition of [0 1]. More specifically we assume that product 1 is available when the addressee is located at a distance  ≤ , while product 2 is available when    ≤ 1 so that 2 Another constituent of USO that is relevant for  2 emissions is the obligations to deliver a certain number of days per week throughout the territory (5 days according to EU regulations, 6 days according to the French postal law). Our model could easily be extended to incorporate this aspect. 3 Alternatively we could assume that both products are available in  1 , while only product 2 is available in  2 . This would lead to a more complicated model where the customer (sender) chooses between the two products for addressees in  1 . The utility of the representative sender is given by
where  1 is the price of  1 and  2 is the price of  2 and where
The operator's cost of processing mail includes a constant (marginal) delivery cost of  which is the same for the two types of mail. In addition there are transportation costs given by  1 ( 1  ) for  + 1 mail of volume  1 at distance  and  2 ( 2  ) for  + 2 mail of volume  2 . We have of course
for any  and : transportation costs are higher the faster the speed of delivery. Furthermore, both  1 ( ) and  2 ( ) increase with distance, and  1 increases faster
Both transportation costs are convex in distance
We also assume
In words, total shipping costs are reduced if we "group" the mail. Rather than shipping say 50 units everyday ( + 1) it is cheaper (per unit) to ship 100 every two days ( + 2). Transportation cost  1 and  2 are "private" costs, i.e., costs borne by the operator. In addition, transportation also has an environmental impact, in particular in terms of  2 emissions. Environmental costs associated with transportation are given by  1 ( 1  ) and  2 ( 2  ) These external costs have the same properties as the private costs   ; formally,
Last but not least, the operator's production technology involves a fixed cost  () which may or may not depend on . More precisely, we shall assume  0 () ≥ 0 and  00 () ≥ 0 Social welfare (total surplus) is given by
where () measures the social benefits of USO which depend on , the proportion of addressees that can be reached on  + 1. We have  0 () and  00 ()  0 so that social benefits are an increasing and concave function of .
Total delivery cost is given by
Observe that this formulation assumes that   is constant over   . This is a necessary condition if the allocation is to be decentralized with two (linear) prices  1 and  2 .
First-best solution
To determine the first-best allocation, we maximize  defined by (5) with respect to  1 ,  2 and . The FOCs are given by
Conditions (6) and (7) state that the marginal benefit for each of the products must equal its marginal cost. Marginal costs consist of three elements: delivery cost (), private transportation cost (    ) and environmental cost (  ). Recall that   concerns all addressees in   . Consequently, the relevant benefits and costs are determined for the entire set of addressees. 4 Since marginal transportation costs are not constant within a given delivery area, it is convenient to define these costs on a per addressee basis:
The first-best solution can be decentralized by the following prices
In words, prices reflect marginal cost which includes a "Pigouvian" tax (i.e., a tax which is equal to the marginal social damage). To give the right signals to the consumer, the prices of the goods have to reflect their social marginal costs. The social marginal cost includes the marginal cost of the externality. We can expect prices to differ ( 1 6 =  2 ) but we cannot presume on their ranking. On the one hand, the  + 1 good generates larger transportation and environmental costs for any given distance , but, on the other hand, good  + 2 is sent to customers that are more distant from the sender than good  + 1. We come back to this comparison in section 6.
The third condition may or may not yield an interior solution. When social benefits of universal service, (), are sufficiently large we may have  = 1. For the sake of interpretation we can rewrite (8) as
This expression shows the impact on social welfare of an increase in the size of the  + 1 area. The first and second terms represent the (private) surplus of sender per addressee (net of delivery and transportation cost) in  + 1 and  + 2 area, respectively. As we increase the size of the  + 1 zone, we gain the difference between  + 1 and  + 2 surplus for the marginal addressee that is shifted from zone  + 2 to zone  + 1. The third term represents the marginal environmental cost of an increase in . The fourth
corresponds to the marginal social benefit of USO net of any extra fixed cost that may be incurred. An interior solution for  (i.e., 0      1) requires  = 0 and thus strikes a balance between the benefits and costs of the increase in .
5 When  = 0 for  = 1, we have a corner solution given by    = 1. Observe that when the environmental cost is neglected and when the first-best solution is interior, the regulator will choose a level of  that is too large. When    = 1, the neglect of environmental costs has no (direct) impact on the optimal . However, both prices will then be set too low.
Uniform pricing
The solution described in the previous section requires (in general) different prices for the delivery areas. Except by coincidence, (9) and (10) imply  1 6 =  2 . When the price is restricted to be uniform ( 1 =  2 = ) this solution can no longer be achieved. We now study the best solution that is feasible under uniform pricing. At this point, no break-even constraint is imposed.
Social welfare continues to be given by (5), except that  1 and  2 are now functions of , determined by the sender's utility maximizing problem. It is convenient to rewrite welfare as  =  +  + , where  is (sender's) utility,  is profit, while  represents social costs and benefits:
Differentiating and using the envelope theorem yields
which implies
so that the price is a weighted sum of marginal costs (including environmental costs).
The expression with respect to  is the same as before, so that
However, the actual level of  will differ from the first-best solution because quantities (demand levels) differ. At this level of generality, it is not possible to assess analytically the impact of uniform pricing on the optimal level of . This is one of the issues that will be examined in more detail in the numerical examples in Section 6.
Second-best
So far, we have not imposed a break even constraint on the operator. In other words, we have not required that revenues be sufficient to cover all the costs, including the fixed cost. When  0 () = 0 the fixed cost then has no impact at all on the solution, while it does affect the optimal level of  when  0 ()  0.
Observe that when no break even constraint is imposed, the use that is made of environmental tax revenues does not matter. Specifically it does not matter, in our quasi-linear setting, whether the revenue is refunded to consumers (on a lump-sum basis) or to the operator. 7 We now turn to the cases where the operator faces a break-even constraint (requiring  ≥ 0). In these circumstances the allocation of environmental tax proceeds does matter. We shall first consider the case where tax revenues are refunded to the operator and then assume that they are not refunded to the operator but to the representative sender.
No uniform pricing constraint

Environmental taxes are refunded to operator
Let  denote the multiplier associated with the break-even constraints. The Lagrangian expression associated with the second-best problem is given by
The decision variables are the same as in the first-best problem, namely  1   2 and . Observe that environmental taxes do not explicitly appear in this problem. They are included in consumer prices  1 and  2 .
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There are two possible types of solution, respectively with  = 0 or   0. The case  = 0 occurs if the first-best solution remains feasible, i.e., yields a revenue high enough to cover fixed cost. When the first-best does not yield budget balance, we are in a Ramsey type second-best with   0, and optimal prices are given by
where   is the absolute value of the price elasticity of good . These expressions can be rewritten as
where  = (1+). These expressions are similar to those derived by Sandmo (1974) who has studied Ramsey taxation in the presence of externalities; see also Cremer et al. (1998) . They state that the implicit tax on good  is a weighted average of the inverse elasticity (Ramsey) term and the Pigouvian term (marginal social damage). Note that when  = 0 these equations reduce to the first-best expressions (9), (10). Differentiating with respect to  yields
which can be rearranged as
When  = 0, this equation reduces (not surprisingly) to the first-best expression (11). For the case   0 its interpretation is also quite straightforward. Equation (17) shows that private costs now have to be multiplied by (1 + ) and that we have to account for the extra revenue: ( 1  1 −  2  2 ) which is positive or negative. Equation (16) , on the other hand, isolates the extra terms (compared to (8)); they can be positive or negative. When the fixed cost does not depend on , the last term vanishes. While expressions (16) and (17) are rather intuitive, they are too complex to yield precise results. In particular, the impact of  on  does not appear to be unambiguous and this is where the simulations presented in Section 6 provide additional insight.
Environmental taxes are not refunded to the operator
So far, we have not introduced a specific notation for the environmental tax. We can think of   − − 0  as the total (per unit) tax levied on product . This includes the contribution to fixed costs and the environmental component. We can introduce a specific environmental tax   in this problem. One can readily verify that when it is refunded to the operator, its level does not matter. The important variable is   . We can set the tax   at the Pigouvian level (or any other level). When   is not refunded to the operator (but to the representative sender) this variable is no longer redundant. The Lagrangian expression is now given by
This expression shows that environmental tax revenue is deducted in the breakeven constraint (and has a weight of (1 + )) and added as tax revenue (redistributed lump sum to the representative sender, with a weight of 1). It is then plain that the optimal policy implies  1 =  2 = 0. For the rest we have the same solution as if tax proceeds were refunded (and as above we have the two cases,  = 0 and   0). This result crucially depends on the fact that the regulator has independent control of   ; if the consumer price is not controlled, the result would be different.
Uniform pricing
The issue of tax revenue refunds arises in the same way as under non-uniform pricing. Consequently, we shall concentrate on the case where tax proceeds are refunded to the operator. 9 The Lagrangian expression associated with the maximization of welfare is given by
Once again, when the first-best solution satisfies the break-even constraint it prevails in the second-best and we have  = 0 When   0 on the other hand, the optimal price satisfies
where  is the absolute value of the demand elasticity of total volume  =
Under a uniform pricing constraint, the traditional Ramsey problem is degenerate and amounts to solving the budget constraint with respect to the sole decision variable (the price). This is because there is no degree of freedom left once all the constraints are satisfied. In the problem considered here, we do have two decision variables  and , so the problem is not degenerate. Still, it is true that for a given level of  the price will be set at the lowest level which yields budget balancing. Consequently, equation (20) will essentially determine  (which is needed in the other FOC). This second expression is obtained by differentiating L with respect to , which yields
This is essentially the same condition as (17). However, while the rule remains the same under uniform pricing, actual levels will differ. To study the impact of uniform pricing on the levels of  and  we have to resort to simulations, to which we now turn.
Numerical simulations
This section provides illustrative numerical simulations. The functional forms and the values of the parameters have not been calibrated to reflect any specific situation. The exercise is nevertheless very useful because it enhances the intuitive understanding of the solution. In addition it allows us to compare the levels of the different variables (prices and ) across scenarios. We use the following functional forms:
2  with 0    1 and   0 Observe that the conditions (1) to (4) are all satisfied with this formulation. Similarly, assume that
We further assume that () −  () = (Log()) with   0. In the first-best analysis, there is no need to separate () from  (): the only thing that matters is the net (of fixed costs) social benefit of the USO. It is only in the second-best analysis (when the postal firm has to break even) that we need to distinguish the two.
Finally, the numerical results that we now report are based on the following values of the parameters:  = 02,  = 34,  = 02,  = 14,  1 = 5,  2 = 49,  = 1,  = 5 and  = 02
The first-best allocation is given by  1 = 4702,  2 = 4527 and  = 0858 Observe that we obtain an interior value of  at the first-best, so that the  + 1 good is sent to all recipients located at a distance at most equal to 0.858, while the recipients located further away from the representative sender are sent  + 2 mail. Because of our assumption of a uniform distribution of recipients, we also obtain that 85.8% of recipients receive  + 1 mail while the remaining 14.2% receive  + 2 mail. The quantity of mail sent per addressee is slightly larger for  + 1 than for  + 2 mail. As a consequence, the share of  + 1 mail in the total mail market is, at 86.3%, larger than the share of people who receive  + 1 mail in the population.
We can contrast this allocation with the optimal allocation when the planner does not take the environmental costs into account:  1 = 4667,  = 1 and thus  2 = 0. In that case, we have a corner solution where the entire country is served with the  + 1 mail. Observe that the quantity of (D+1) mail sent is lower than in the first-best allocation where the environmental concerns are taken into account. decentralized with the following prices (given by equations (9) and (10)):
Interestingly, we have that  2   1 because the transport costs are much larger for good 2, which is sent to the customers who reside far away from the representative sender. The marginal environmental cost of good 1 is larger than for good 2, but the difference is smaller than the difference in marginal transport costs.
We now impose a uniform pricing constraint, so that  1 =  2 = . In that case, the optimal allocation is  = 0859,  1 = 4691,  2 = 4591 which is obtained with the uniform price  = 0309 As explained above, the optimal uniform price is a linear combination of the optimal differentiated prices identified above. As a consequence, there is more  + 2 mail sent per addressee than with the optimal differentiated prices (since  + 2 mail was more expensive with these prices), and less  +1 mail per addressee. As in the optimal differentiated prices case, there is more  + 1 mail per addressee in zone  1 than  +2 mail per addressee in zone  2 . Interestingly, the  +1 area is slightly larger at 0.859 than with optimal differentiated prices. The total mail market volume increases slightly compared to the optimal differentiated prices case, while the share of  + 1 mail decreases to 86.1%.
We now move to the second-best approach. The differentiated prices that decentralize the first-best allocation ( 1 = 0298  2 = 0373) give a profit before fixed cost  () of 0.226. If the fixed cost at the optimal value of ,  (0858), is smaller than 0.226, these prices are also the second-best (Ramsey) optimal prices. To determine whether first-best prices are also second-best prices, we thus need to disentangle () from  (). We now assume that () = (Log()) but that  () =  -i.e., that it is a constant. This constant  does not change the results reported above, as long as   0226: the first-best prices are also second-best optimal. We now study what happens when  is increased above this threshold. Figure 2 reports the second-best optimal value of  as a function of  , while Figure 3 reports the second-best optimal value of  1 and  2 , and Figure 4 that of  1 and  2 , as a function of  . As  increases, the operator has to increase both prices in order to recoup its fixed cost. We also have that the welfare-maximizing operator increases the size of the  + 1 market as  increases. We obtain that  2   1 and that  1   2 as long as   1. As  increases above 4.9, all the market is devoted to  + 1 mail ( = 1). The maximum level of  that can be covered is equal
The first-best allocation ( 1 = 4702,  2 = 4527,  = 0858) can be Figure 3: Second-best optimal value of  1 and  2 as functions of   = 1: profit is maximized when all the market is devoted to  + 1 mail. We have done the same exercise for the second-best uniform optimal price. The uniform price that decentralizes the first-best allocation ( = 0309) gives a profit before fixed cost of 0.227. If the fixed cost  is smaller than 0.227, these prices are also the second-best (Ramsey) optimal prices. If   0227, the break-even constraint is binding and the second-best uniform price is larger than 0.309. The results we obtain with the optimal uniform price are similar to those reported in Figures 2 to 4 : as  increases, the uniform price  increases together with the size of the  + 1 market, . For a large enough value of  ,  = 1 and we are back to the results presented in Figures 2 to 4 , since the +1 mail is the only good available in the economy. The profit-maximizing outcome to 5.601 and corresponds to the (profit-maximizing) price  1 = 263 and to is then the same whether or not a uniform pricing constraint is imposed. 
Conclusion
This paper has studied the relationship between USO and environmental concern in the postal sector. We have concentrated on a specific USO, namely the obligation to process and deliver mail on a D+1 basis, irrespective of the distance between sender and addressee. This requirement may force the operator to use relatively more polluting means of transportation (such as planes). In addition, it may lead to an inefficient use of other means of transportation (half empty trucks may have to hit the road to meet the constraint). We have studied how the USO should be designed to properly account for the environmental cost in a variety of situations ranging from a first-best world to a (Ramsey-type) second-best world with differentiated or uniform prices. We have shown that, when the social cost of emission is accounted for, it may be desirable to scale down the D+1 obligation and to restrict it to specific geographic areas. More precisely, the design of the D+1 obligation must strike a balance between social benefits of USO and its environmental costs. We have also studied how postal products should be priced to account for their environmental impact. We have shown that the marginal social damage should be reflected in the prices. However, the strict Pigouvian rule that applies in a first-best setting has to be amended when the operator faces a binding break-even constraint.
Our study constitutes just a first step. To obtain a more complete understanding of the importance of environmental consideration for the postal sector it can (and should) be extended in a number of directions. First, as already mentioned, one can look at other aspects of the USO that affect the environment, like the requirement to deliver a certain number of days throughout the territory. Second, one can consider a richer spectrum of products, by assuming that in some areas (or everywhere) both types of mail (D+1 and D+2) are offered at different prices. Third, and more ambitiously the possibility of competition can be introduced. This is especially interesting because entry in itself will have an impact on the environment (for instance through the duplication of delivery networks).
